Mercer Law Review
Volume 27
Number 1 Annual Survey of Georgia Law

Article 23

12-1975

Constitutional Law--No Right to Counsel at Probation Revocation
Hearings
Robert R. Potter

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons, and the Criminal Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Potter, Robert R. (1975) "Constitutional Law--No Right to Counsel at Probation Revocation Hearings,"
Mercer Law Review: Vol. 27 : No. 1 , Article 23.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol27/iss1/23

This Casenote is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

NOTES
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-NO RIGHT TO COUNSEL
AT PROBATION REVOCATION HEARINGS
In Mercer v. Hopper,' the Georgia Supreme Court, in a four-sentence per
curiam opinion, held that "[tihere is no right to counsel at a probation
revocation hearing in Georgia." 2 Mercer pleaded guilty to, and was convicted of, three charges of driving under the influence of intoxicants and
one charge of forgery. He received a five year sentence for forgery and three
12-month sentences for the DUI charges, the latter to run consecutively,
but concurrently with the forgery sentence. All sentences were ordered to
be served on probation.'
Less than a month after his conviction, Mercer was arrested for public
drunkenness, and was again arrested one week later for the same offense.'
He was never tried on these charges, but his probation was revoked at a
subsequent probation revocation hearing and he was imprisoned to serve
the remainder of the sentences originally imposed. Mercer was not afforded
the assistance of counsel at the probation revocation hearing. Whether or
not he requested the assistance of counsel is unclear.'
Mercer petitioned for habeas corpus, arguing that he should have been
allowed the assistance of counsel at his probation revocation hearing.' Both
the habeas corpus court and the Georgia Supreme Court disagreed.
Though jurisdictions have split as to whether there is a right to counsel
at probation revocation hearings, most, including Georgia, have long followed the view that there is not.7 The predominant rationale has been that
the constitutional guarantee of the right to counsel should not extend to a
probation revocation proceeding since that proceeding is substantially different in nature from a criminal prosecution.' Those jurisdictions that have
recognized the right to counsel at the revocation hearing have generally
1. 233 Ga. 620, 212 S.E.2d 799 (1975).
2. Id. at 620, 212 S.E.2d at 800.
3. Id. at 622, 212 S.E.2d at 800-01 (Ingram, J., dissenting) (the facts in this case were
reported only in the dissenting opinion).
4. Mercer's mother had telephoned the sheriff's office regarding her other son who was
apparently riding on a tractor while drunk. The sheriff could not locate Mercer's brother but
did find and arrest Mercer, who, according to his mother's testimony, had come home from
work and was in bed when the sheriff arrived. Id. at 622, 212 S.E.2d at 801 (dissent).
5. Justice Hall, concurring, stated that while Mercer had testified at the evidentiary
hearing on his habeas corpus petition, he stood mute before the judge and did not request
counsel at his probation revocation hearing. Id. at 621, 212 S.E.2d at 800. But Justice Ingram,
dissenting, referred specifically to "appellant's alleged request for counsel." Id. at 624, 212
S.E.2d at 802.
6. Id. at 622, 212 S.E.2d at 801 (dissent).
7. See Annot., Probation-Revocation-Rightto Counsel, 44 A.L.R.3d 306, 311-14 (1972).
8. See Annot., Parole or Probation Revocation, 36 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1973).
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relied on due process grounds, asserting that where liberty is concerned,
even conditional liberty, justice and fairness require the right to counsel.'
Dutton v. Willis," decided by the Georgia Supreme Court in 1967, dealt
with the precise issue raised in Mercer. There the court adopted the "general and accepted rule in the state and federal courts" and held that the
failure to provide counsel to a probationer at his probation revocation
hearing "did not violate his right to counsel under either the federal or the
state Constitution."" The court, after quoting from the Statewide Probation Act of 1956,12 which at least arguably established the right to counsel
at probation revocation hearings,'" chose to ignore that statute. The court's
reasoning was simply that the hearing is not a criminal prosecution, even
if the alleged probation violation is criminal in nature. 4
After the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Mempa v.
Rhay,' 5 several jurisdictions shifted their position on this critical issue and
extended the right to counsel.'" However, in Reece v. Pettijohn,7 the Georgia Supreme Court rejected an opportunity to do so, choosing instead to
follow its prior decision in Dutton.'" The court, in a short opinion, distinguished Mempa on its facts 9 and reiterated its prior position. Reece may
be most significant for its scathing dissent by Justice Gunter which capsulizes the viewpoint advocating the right to counsel in Georgia. The dissent
labeled Dutton "patently erroneous" and outlined three distinct bases of
support for the right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing in Geor20
gia.
9. See Annot., Probation-Revocation-Rightto Counsel, supra note 7 at 321-23.
10. 223 Ga. 209, 154 S.E.2d 221 (1967).
11. Id. at 210-11, 154 S.E.2d at 223.
12. GA. CODE ANN. §27-2713 (Rev. 1972) in pertinent part provides that
[t]he court, upon the probationer being brought before it, may commit him or
release him with or without bail to await further hearing or it may dismiss the
charge. If such charge is not dismissed at this time, the court shall give the probationer an opportunity to be fully heard at the earliest possible date on his own
behalf, in person or by counsel....
13. See the dissent by Justice Gunter in Reece v. Pettijohn, 229 Ga. 619, 620, 193 S.E.2d
841, 843 (1972).
14. 223 Ga. at 210, 154 S.E.2d at 223.
15. 389 U.S. 128 (1967). In Mempa the Supreme Court ruled that a probationer does have
a right to counsel at a probation revocation hearing under a Washington statute which
deferred sentencing in probation cases.
16. See Annot., Probation-Revocation-Rightto Counsel, supra note 7 at 324.
17. 229 Ga. 619, 193 S.E.2d 841 (1972).
18. Id. at 619, 193 S.E.2d at 842. The court in Reece also relied upon Shaw v. Henderson,
430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970) which provided the step-by-step analysis that Reece lacked. 229
Ga. at 619, 193 S.E.2d at 842.
19. The Georgia Supreme Court was not alone in its reasoning, as most jurisdictions which
had previously not recognized the right to counsel in revocation hearings decided to construe
Mempa to pertain only to deferred sentencing situations. See Annot., Probation-Revocation-Right to Counsel, supra note 7, at 314.
20. 229 Ga. at 621, 193 S.E.2d at 843. First, Justice Gunter, dissenting, interpreted
Mempa to necessitate the right to counsel at revocation proceedings, construing the following
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The United States Supreme Court, focusing in part on this issue in
2
' seemed to reach a compromise between these antithGagnon v. Scarpelli,
etic viewpoints. The Court, reviving the rationale of Betts v. Brady,2 2 held
that the revocation authority should decide on a case by case basis whether
due process requires that an indigent probationer be represented by counsel. 2 3 The Court declined to set strict guidelines but did state that
[p]resumptively, it may be said that counsel should be provided in cases
where, after being informed of his right to request counsel, the probationer
or parolee makes such a request, based on a timely and colorable claim
(i) that he has not committed the alleged violation of the conditions upon
which he is at liberty; or (ii) that, even if the violation is a matter of public
record or is uncontested, there are substantial reasons which justified or
mitigated the violation and make revocation inappropriate, and 21that the
reasons are complex or otherwise difficult to develop or present.
But in Mercer the Georgia Supreme Court, addressing this question for
the first time since Gagnon, declined to follow that decision's rationale,
guidelines, or requirements. 25 The court, in its terse opinion, pinpointed
the issue and reaffirmed its position that "[tihere is no right to counsel
at a probation revocation hearing in Georgia. '2 The decision was based
to Gagnon and without analysis, diswholly on Reece, without reference
27
cussion or recitation of the facts.
Both the dissenting and concurring opinions, recognizing that Gagnon
rendered Reece invalid, applied the guidelines set forth in Gagnon to the
facts of the case. 28 The dissent criticized the court's reliance on Reece and
argued that the fundamental fairness rationale of Gagnon required the
passage to so require: "[A] lawyer must be afforded at this proceeding whether it be labeled
a revocation or probation or a deferred sentencing." Id. quoting from Mempa v. Rhay, 389
U.S. 128, 137 (1967). Secondly, since probation terms and conditions are equivalent to "rules
or laws of the State," the alleged violation of the former, as well as the latter, should entitle
the accused to the privileges and benefits of counsel under the Georgia Constitution as set
forth in GA. CODE ANN. §2-105 (Rev. 1973). 229 Ga. at 621-22, 193 S.E.2d at 843. Finally, GA.
CODE ANN. §27-2713 (Rev. 1972) specifically affords a probationer the right to counsel at his
probation revocation hearing. 229 Ga. at 622, 193 S.E.2d at 843.
21. 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
22. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Betts the Court ruled that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment was not governed by strict standards and did not require that the right
to counsel be afforded defendents in all criminal cases. Rather, the Court adopted a flexible
case by case approach "tested by an appraisal of the totality of facts in a given case." Id. at
462.
23. 411 U.S. at 790.
24. Id. The Court also suggested that the responsible authority consider whether "the
probationer appears to be capable of speaking effectively for himself." Id. at 791.
25. Id. at 790-91.
26. 233 Ga. at 620, 212 S.E.2d at 800.
27. Id. at 620, 212 S.E.2d at 799-800.
28. Id. at 621, 212 S.E.2d at 800 (Hall, J., concurring specially): "Under these facts I
conclude that Mercer did not by his conduct bring himself within the rule of Scarpelli, and
due process did not require that counsel be furnished him." (Emphasis added.)
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appointment of counsel in this case.29
3
While the outcome of Mercer's habeas corpus petition was predictable,
the manner in which the decision was reached by the Supreme Court of
Georgia was quite the opposite. 3' It was inconceivable. That the court
blatantly ignored a United States Supreme Court decision, despite rational and analytical attempts at dissuasion by the concurring and dissenting justices, is inexplicable and unjustified. While Dutton and Reece were
able to cite similar rulings in other jurisdictions for support,3 2 such is not
33
the case with Mercer.
In Mercer the Georgia Supreme Court is plainly wrong. Gagnon does not
3
suggest a case by case approach; it requires it.
1 The court simply disregarded this requirement without explanation, and, of course, without the
prerogative to do so. The decision is irresponsible in that it so clearly
contravenes the holding of the United States Supreme Court in Gagnon.
This adamant position of the Georgia Supreme Court in denying counsel
Id. at 624-25, 212 S.E.2d at 803 (Ingram, J., dissenting):
I believe the rationale of Gagnon requires that counsel should have been appointed
in this case. But the major fallacy I find with the majority opinion is in following
the broad rule stated in Reece v. Pettijohn . . .which, in my opinion, clearly
contravenes the holding of the U. S. Supreme Court in Gagnon . . .and is incorrect. (Emphasis added.)
30. See Cole, Annual Survey of Georgia Law: ConstitutionalLaw, 25 MERCER L. REV. 73,
83 (1973):
The dimensions of this problem have been changed by the United States Supreme
Court's ruling in Gagnon v. Scarpelli. . . .However, the practical effect of denying
counsel to indigents in probation revocation hearings in Georgia will probably remain substantially unchanged because the Gagnon opinion leaves the decision as
to when an attorney is necessary (because of the complexity of the hearing) to the
probation department.
See also Fisher, Parole and ProbationRevocation ProceduresAfter Morissey and Gagnon, 65
JouR. CRIM. L. 46, 55 (1974):
In probation revocation proceedings, the Parole Board wields broad discretion in
revoking a conditional release. . . .Indeed, judicial decisions seem to indicate that
the Parole Board's judgment is virtually unreviewable.
31. Mercer was based entirely on Reece. In this regard, see Annot., Parole or Probation
Revocation, supra note 8 at 1118:
A fairly significant number of cases [including Reece] decided just prior to the
decision in Gagnon v. Scarpelli reached the conclusion that due process does not
require the presence of counsel at revocation proceedings under any circumstances.
These cases obviously have no continuing validity. . . .(Emphasis added.)
32. See Shaw v. Henderson, 430 F.2d 1116 (5th Cir. 1970); Welsh v. United States, 348
F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1965); Jones v. Rivers, 338 F.2d 862 (4th Cir. 1964); Bennett v. United
States, 158 F.2d 412 (8th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 822 (1947). See also Annot.,
Probation-Revocation-Rightto Counsel, supra note 7at 311-14.
33. See Shead v. Quatsoe, 486 F.2d 694 (7th Cir. 1973) (remanded for further consideration in light of Gagnon); M'Clary v. California Adult Authority, 481 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1973)
(remanded in light of Gagnon). See also Annot., Paroleor ProbationRevocation, supra note
8 at 1120-23.
34. 411 U.S. at 790.
29.
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in all probation revocation hearings is a blight upon the record of the court
which should be rectified at the first opportunity.
ROBERT

R.

POTER

